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Abstract 
    We analyze in this study cause of herding in a stock market. Information 
cascades have often been considered as a primary choice. However, we present 
evidences inconsistent in this study. Employing intraday order book data, our analysis 
supports the inclusion of of an alternative theory based on search cost of investors, in 
addition to the information cascade argument. Specifically, previous works studied 
daily data or those with lower frequency based on a herding measure of Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1992). We adopt instead the measure of Patterson and Sharma 
(2006) and argue that the search model of Vayanos and Wang (2007) characterizes 
herding phenomenon better at market open. Our analysis is also consistent with the 
information competition equilibrium of Back, Cao and Willard (2000) and dynamic 
friction model of Hu (2006).We find that stronger order flow herding is driven by 
lower transactions cost and shorter time to fill an order. Herding tends to occur in 
trading of high-cap, high turnover stocks, which contradicts prediction of the 
information cascade hypothesis. Search cost effect is stronger at market open, while 
information cascade effect is stronger at market close. Therefore our study suggests 
that herding should be related both to intrinsic search cost structure of investors as 
well as information related factors.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Herding behavior of investors has been a central issue of literatures in behavioral finance. 
Particularly, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) defined ‘herding’ as a common investing pattern from 
clustered investors within a given period. Banerjee (1992) considered ‘herded trading behavior’ as 
forgoing investors’ own information and following others’ strategies. Information cascades have 
often been considered as a theory characterizing herding behavior, where informed traders ignore 
their own private signal of information and trade in response to observed trades in the market. 
However, in a given period, this characterization has to be applicable to all assets in a certain 
market. One class of participants would follow trading actions of another, and information quality 
in the period has to be poor to drive that, as argued in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992, 
BHW) and Avery and Zemsky (1999, AZ). Most of the literatures study herding behavior of 
institutional investors and primarily in a medium horizon time frame. On a daily basis, herding is 
suggested to be short-lived and, as suggested by Christoffersen and Tang (2009), herding increases 
with data frequency, and that herding should be less significant in stocks with larger size and higher 
turnover. We find, however, in our study that investor herding, on a intraday basis, is not fully 
consistent with the prediction of information cascade hypothesis as herding is more pronounced in 
stocks with good information quality of the larger firms, with higher turnover and lower price-book 
ratios. Herding is significantly related in part to buy-sell order price spreads as well as time to fill 
for an order, especially at market open, suggesting an alternative model is needed to characterize the 
herding phenomenon. 
Generally, herding implies a leader-follower behavior pattern in terms of trading. Henker, 
Henker, and Mitsios (2006), argued that herding should be considered in an intraday context as 
market participants, at times of extreme price volatility, observe one another in trading patterns to 
interpret news rather than rely on own private models. Extreme price movements within a short 
period of time, according to laboratory experiment of sequential trading by Guarino and Cipriani 
(2008), could generate a no-trade information cascade, rather than trading concentration, in the 
presence of transactions cost. So the implications of BHW and AZ may have to be modified in the 
analysis of trading with high frequency. Alternatively, the competitive equilibrium of informed 
trading introduced by Back, Cao and Willard (2000, BCW) suggests that heavy trading occurs when 
informed traders compete in aggressive trading with correlated information when market opens, 
where more market depth is observed than the rest of the session. As the market approaches its 
close, trading becomes heavy again as informed traders aggressively exploit their remaining private 
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information. This model explains intraday trading patterns, as well as trading concentration, without 
investors giving up own information. 
The commonly used herding measure of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992, LSV) cannot 
capture the sequential interactions of market participants especially in an intra-day framework. Also 
in an intra-day context, herding measurement could be flawed without controlling for factors like 
day trading, portfolio rebalancing and ETF portfolio tracking. In addition, quote-driven markets 
have been the focus of previous works on herding and buy/sell orders have to be imputed. However, 
order-driven trading mechanism, popular in the new electronic trading mechanism around the world, 
records directly buy and sell orders. The sequential patterns of order flows characterize trading 
intensity and information distribution, particularly within a very short period of time, of market 
participants. Hu (2006) suggested that an information-only argument is more applicable in 
quote-driven markets where trade initiation reflects nature of information. In an order-driven market, 
dynamic frictional costs, in the sense of Stoll (2000), have to be taken into account along with 
information. Hu (2006) found that frictional costs are the smallest at market open, consistent with 
our findings. We therefore intend to address causes of herding with a cost-based framework of 
trading concentration combined with a herding measure focusing on order flow patterns. 
Vayanos and Wang (2007, VW) introduced a search-based model of asset trading, where search 
or trading cost differs and investors are constrained financially. Trading concentration occurs in a 
clientele equilibrium where investors with similar cost choose to trade similar assets. The asset with 
concentrated trading tends to trade at a higher price than one with identical-payoff but require 
higher trading cost in a search-based equilibrium of VW. We show in our analysis that stronger 
order flow herding is driven by shorter search time and lower transactions cost. We also find that 
herding in stocks with large cap, high turnover and low P/B ratio is more apparent in stocks with 
returns ranking at the highest deciles, indicating herding results in relative higher prices. 
Interestingly, information cascade effect increases as market goes further away from open or near 
close. This pattern is further supported by the gradual weakening of search cost effect towared 
market close. Individuals exhibit stronger herding phenomenon, but herding of institutionals are 
driven more by lower transactions costs. While herding of individual is inconsistent with BHW, that 
of institutionals seems to support VW more explicitly. Our results are also consistent with BCW in 
that competitive informed trading is based more on correlated signals, such as those on firms with 
large cap or high turnover, at market open, but more on private ones at market close. More 
importantly, search cost effect is found to be stronger at market open, while information cascade 
effect is stronger at market close. 
To measure herding, we adopted the bootstrapped run test method of Patterson and Sharma 
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(2006, PS), which captures intraday order sequences in particular. Previous works on data with 
lower frequency relies on LSV, which is more easily to be constructed within a longer time frame. 
It does not consider the intensity of trading concentration as trading proceeds, but uses only the 
proportion of participants buying and selling within a period. To the extent that order flow matters 
more in shorter periods, LSV cannot be expected to depict characteristics of trading concentration 
with high frequency data. Runs of buy or sell orders provide more realistic characterization of 
herding intuitively as well as statistically. The t-test for the LSV measure may suffer from 
distributional problems when measuring window gets shorter and shorter, while the test for PS runs 
relies on sample-generated critical values and is thus more powerful in making inferences. As LSV 
measure within a given period may include orders in or not in runs, PS model gives a more rigorous 
definition of herding than LSV. PS method also does not require herding to accommodate extreme 
market conditions. 
In emerging financial markets, turnover and market volume are often generated by individual 
investors. Herding of individuals is worth studying in these markets as it interacts with institutional 
herding, as suggested in Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Barber, Odean and Zhu (2003), and Dorn, 
Huberman and Sengmueller (2008). In the past, many works employ monthly as well as quarterly 
data. However, as high frequency data becomes more available, there are more studies focusing on 
intraday herding behavior. Mian and Adam (2001) explored intraday stock index returns of 
Australian Stock Exchange and discovered that volatility rises with frequency of data in a given 
period. The degree of non-normality exhibited in intra-day data, which posed as a problem for the 
t-test of LSV, is not necessarily information-related but implies certain ties to herding. Cont and 
Bouchard (2000) investigated how the fat-tailed distribution of stock returns is related to herding 
behavior, as the deviation from normality under high frequency observation cannot be accounted for 
by ordinary statistical modeling. To explore further on these issues, we focuses beyond herding 
phenomenon itself to examine intraday interaction between individual and institutional investors.  
 We studied intraday herding behavior of the four types of investors in the Taiwan stock market. 
There are several elements that distinguish our study from other literatures on herding. Similar to 
Christoffersen and Tang (2009) we also used daily and intra-day tick data, but the order book data 
allow us to identify buy and sell orders directly. Investors type, which includes individuals and three 
types of institutionals, the proprietary dealers, the investment trust, and QFII, are also identified. 
The identification investor type helps clarifying if herding is driven more by information cascade in 
the sense of BHW or a search-cost based motivation according to VW. Our empirical results support 
the latter more than the popular former. We have also found that individual investor’s herding 
follows that of the QFII and investment trust, which suggests the search move of individual investor 
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lags behind institutional investors. Although individual investors account for 70% of the overall 
trading volume, their herding is induced more by search horizon than local instutionals. Foreign 
institutionals are seen to herd more in stocks with the three characteristics mentioned above than 
local institutionals. Yang (2007) showed how marginal institutional investors engage in short-term 
trading due to cost factors compared to other institutional investor going after long-term values of 
stocks. Ting (2009) indicated the, within a given period, foreign institutional investors in Taiwan 
tend to follow those with a higher turnover rate. The short horizon of marginal foreign institutional 
investor may have induced them to concentrate in trading stocks with the said characteristics.  
The main implication of our results would help, on the one hand, investors in general to locate 
at any given period the most cost-efficient market to trade, which lowers average trading cost and 
enhance market trading volume3. On the other hand, our analysis contributes to regulators as well as 
exchanges to understand if certain extreme herding phenomenon entails ramification or any other 
actions. Unnecessary market alarms could be greatly reduced and market efficiency is hence 
improved. This study also provides an explanation for the portion of volatility that is not due to 
changes in fundamentals or other known effects, while also adding to the literature on further 
understanding of herding. The results could prove highly relevant in achieving a better 
understanding of market functioning and serve both academics and practitioners, given that an 
understanding of which variables affect volatility and the nature of their influence could contribute 
to much more accurate forecasting and, furthermore, to the definition of new risk measures or new 
hedging strategies. A brief literature review and discussion of how to measure herding are given in 
Section II. Data and empirical results are laid out in Section III. Section IV gives detailed discussion 
and compares implications of our findings on the two competing hypotheses. Conclusion is given in 
Section V. 
 
II. What causes herding, and how to measure it? 
The herding behavior is considered an anomaly that challenges the efficient market paradigm. 
Although this behavior is considered irrational, it can be rational at an individual level. At a group 
level it is irrational as it leads to mispricing. Literatures argue that the herding arises from the 
interaction among agents as they copy each other’s decisions. The models of BHW and Bannerjee 
(1992) considered that individuals make their decisions sequentially at a time, taking into account 
                                               
3
 This is indeed consistent with Hu (2006) where it was shown that the participation of individual investor helps 
reducing frictional costs. The significant pattern of individual following herding of QFII explains why their herding is 
also significantly influenced by search horizon. 
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the decisions of the individuals preceding them. The model proposed by Cont and Bouchaud (2000) 
considered, instead of a sequential decision process, a random communication structure. Random 
interactions between agents lead to a heterogeneous market structure. AZ argues that information 
cascades will be short-lived and fragile as one contrarian trade from the herd can quickly stop an 
information cascade. 
What causes herding 
The BHW model assumes all investors can invest either in asset A or B — but not both — at 
zero cost. An investor with t predecessors will choose A if and only if the conditional probability 
that A is successful given all private and public information P(A|Ht, s) is greater than 1/2, where Ht 
denotes the observable history of the decisions of all predecessors up to round t, and s = a, b, the 
private signal. Assuming that all predecessors are perfectly rational Bayesians, an investor would 
follow his private signal to reveal it unless an informational cascade has started. If a signal can be 
deduced from the chosen action, it is called an imputed signal. A cascade on asset S, an S—cascade, 
starts when an investor should buy asset S regardless of his own signal, i.e., when P(S|Ht, s) > 1/2, 
for s = a, b. Depending on the a priori probabilities and the signal precisions, this requires a certain 
number of (imputed) a or b signals. If the first investor chooses A, the second should already 
disregard his own signal: even with a b signal, the second investor should choose A since 
)()|()()|(
)()|()|(
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A pattern of conformity can arise if initial predictions coincide and the inferred information 
dominates the private information of subsequent decision makers. The followers go along with a 
consensus prediction, even if it would not be the "correct" prediction made only on the basis of their 
own sample. 
 The AZ model is an extended BHW model with a flexible price. The price is set by a market 
maker who efficiently incorporates all publicly available information. The decision of an investor is 
straightforward. All information is revealed, and therefore it is incorporated into the price 
immediately after each decision. The price is a martingale with respect to public information, i.e.,  
ttt pHpE =+ )|( 1  
for all t, and one cannot take advantage of the knowledge of historical price movements to earn 
superior returns. As everyone follows his signal, rational herding cannot occur. Note that not trading 
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is never optimal (unless one introduces transaction costs) because subjects always have an 
informational advantage over the market maker. 
 Alternatively, VW proposed a model with two assets traded in two markets respectively. 
Measures of buyers and sellers of asset i are denoted by ibµ  and isµ  respectively. For the buyers, 
there is a possibility of either enjoying the full value of the dividend flow or switching to a lower 
level with a Poisson rate of κ. Because buyers differ in their switching rates κ, they have different 
reservation values in the bargaining game. Investors are heterogeneous in their horizons, which are 
inversely related to the switching rates κ. More trading could be generated by shorter horizons as it 
reduces search times and trading costs. Switching rates could correspond to buyers’ characteristics, 
such as long horizon is more relevant to insurance companies, while shorter ones belong to hedge 
funds. A clientele equilibrium where market 1 is the one with the most sellers has the following 
properties: 
(a) More buyers and sellers in market 1: )(1 κµb  > )(2 κµb  and )(1 κµs  > )(2 κµ s   
(b) Higher buyer-seller ratio in market 1: )(/)( 11 κµκµ sb  > )(/)( 22 κµκµ sb  
(c) Higher prices in market 1: )(1 κp  > )(2 κp  for all κ. 
Market 1 has not only more sellers than market 2, but also more buyers, and a higher buyer-seller 
ratio. Moreover, the price that any given buyer expects to pay is higher in market 1. Since there are 
more sellers in market 1, buyers’ search times are shorter. Therefore, holding all else constant, 
buyers prefer entering into market 1. To restore equilibrium, prices in market 1 must be higher than 
in market 2. This is accomplished by higher buying pressure in market 1, i.e., higher buyer-seller 
ratio. In the resulting equilibrium, there is a clientele effect. Investors with high switching rates, 
who have a stronger preference for short search times, prefer market 1 despite the higher prices. On 
the other hand, low-switching-rate investors, who are more patient, value more the lower prices in 
market 2. The clientele effect is, in turn, what accounts for the larger measure of sellers in market 1 
since the high-switching-rate buyers turn faster into sellers. So in essence, cost characteristics of 
investors determine concentration of trading and prices, rather than information about the assets. 
Individual investors trading for own accounts with unleveraged funds are supposed to have 
lower switching rates and prefer market 2 in the model above. However, when market moves fast, 
lack of knowledge could elevate their switching rates so they turn to trade in market 1 instead. 
Naturally, there should be more herding from the individual investors in an bullish stock market 
according to prediction (a) and (b). In this market individual investor may prefer to trade stocks 
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with larger market capitalization, higher turnover and lower price-to-book ratios, which require 
lower search costs. According to prediction (c) above, we would expect the stock characteristic 
preference to be more eminent in stocks enjoying higher prices than others. 
Although foreign institutional investors are now holding about one third of the total values of 
Taiwanese stocks, their overall turnover rate is in general at around 10% monthly. The positive 
relation between holdings and turnover within given periods presented by Ting (2009) suggest that 
marginal foreign institutional investors are incurring risk-adjusted cost situation as discussed in 
Yang (2007). These marginal foreign institutional investors are under shorter horizons due to 
liquidity reasons related to allocating funds across borders.  
LSV measure 
LSV (1992) based their criterion on the trades conducted by a group of market participants 
(fund managers on their empirical application), comparing the actual behavior with an ideal 
behavior considering independent and random trades.  
[ ] [ ][ ]titiNHtititi pEpEpEpLSV ,,,,, −−−=  (1) 
Where tip ,  is the actual percentages of fund managers that buy stock i at time t. [ ]tipE ,  is the 
expected value of tip ,  defined as the average buying percentage of all managers trading at period t. 
[ ].NHE  is the expectation under the hypothesis that there is no herding. [ ][ ]titiNH pEpE ,, −  is an 
adjustment factor which is the expected value of the first term under the null hypothesis that there is 
no herding. The theoretical distribution of tip ,  considering independent and random trades for 
each manager is a binomial distribution with mean [ ]tipE , . 
This measure has one major drawback: it does not consider the volume of manager’s trading. 
The measure uses only the number of managers buying and selling, without regard to the monetary 
value they trade. Wermers (1999) thus proposed a modification of this herding measure in order to 
capture differences of behavior when traders are buying or selling. 
Cross-sectional standard deviation (CSSD) 
Christie and Huang (1995) take another approach and consider aggregate market herding in 
equity return data. They measure the market impact of herding by considering the dispersion or the 
cross-sectional standard deviation (CSSD) of returns. The rationale for the use of this dispersion 
measure is that if market wide herding occurs, returns on individual stocks will be more than 
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usually clustered around the market return as investors suppress their private opinion in favor of the 
market consensus. Traditional asset pricing theory predicts that the dispersion of returns increases 
with the aggregate market return due to varying stock sensitivities to market returns. Since 
dispersion measures the average proximity of individual returns to the mean, when all stock returns 
move in perfect unison with the market, dispersion is zero. When individual returns differ from the 
market return, however, the level of dispersion increases. Christie and Huang (1995) contend that 
when investors ignore the idiosyncratic features of stocks, we would expect to see lower than 
average level of dispersion during periods characterized by large market movements. 
Chang, Cheng and Khorana (2000) modify the Christie and Huang (1995) model to use the 
cross-sectional absolute standard deviation (CSAD) of returns as a measure of dispersion to detect 
the existence of herding in the U.S., Hong Kong, Japanese, South Korean and Taiwanese markets. 
Their model suggests that if market participants herd around indicators, a nonlinear relationship will 
result between the absolute standard deviation of returns and the average market return during 
periods of large price movements. They use this model to examine individual returns on a monthly 
basis and find a significant nonlinear relationship between equity return dispersion and the 
underlying market price movement of the South Korean and Taiwanese markets. They do not, 
however, find evidence to support the presence of herding in the developed markets of the U.S., 
Hong Kong, and Japan. 
Christie and Huang (1995) define the cross-sectional dispersion at time t as  
∑
=
−=
n
i
ptititt rrwCSD
1
2)(   (2)  
where itr  ( ptr ) is the return of security i (portfolio p) for time t and itw  is the weight of each 
stock i in portfolio p at time t. When all securities in the portfolio move in concert tCSD  is zero; 
conversely, tCSD  is large when the distribution of is dispersed. That is, tCSD  quantifies the 
average proximity of individual returns to the realized average. If the average volatility of securities 
comprising the portfolio is assumed to be exogenous, then the volatility of the portfolio will be an 
increasing function of the average volatility of component securities, while portfolio volatility will 
be negatively related to the expected cross-sectional dispersion E[CSD] of component security 
returns. An increase in portfolio volatility should generate a decrease in the dispersion of returns. If 
portfolio volatility is assumed to be exogenous, then E[CSD] is positively related to the average 
volatility of securities. If we define market wide herding to be when all securities in the (market) 
portfolio move together, then during periods where herding behavior prevails average volatility will 
be low and dispersion will also be low.  
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Christie and Huang (1995) use this decomposition to arrive at a test for herding under extreme 
market conditions, where herding is defined as traders ignoring their private assessment of 
individual assets and following the trend of the overall market. Thus, if herding occurs, individual 
returns will converge to the aggregate market return, resulting in decreased dispersion of individual 
returns from the market return as argued by Gleason, Mathur and Peterson (2003). 
Data Frequency 
 The data frequency of many studies precludes the detection of herding that occurs within the 
trading day. Considering intraday data would uncover issues ignored in studies with lower data 
frequency yet important to the understanding of herding. Gleason, Mathur and Peterson (2003) use 
intraday U.S. Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) data with the Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang, 
Cheng and Khorana (2000) models to examine whether traders herd during periods of extreme 
market movements. They find no evidence of herding in this specialized market. Additional 
motivation to use high frequency data is related to the volatility literature. The fat tails of the 
distribution of stock returns correspond to large fluctuations in prices. The fluctuations are difficult 
to explain in terms of variations in fundamental economic variables as indicated by Shiller (1989), 
not necessarily related to the arrival of information (Cutler, Poterba and Summers, 1989), and could 
be explained as herding. If a large number of agents coordinate their actions, the imbalance between 
buy and sell orders will cause a substantial price change (Bouchaud, 2002). Shortening observation 
period reduces possibility of extreme price movements and helps the study of herding under normal 
market condition. The distribution of order data used in this study provides a more comprehensive 
characterization of investors’ intended market moves than realized transaction prices. 
Runs Test 
Most of the studies carried out to test for herding in capital markets have proved 
inconclusive. The measure of LSV relies on t-test to determine significance of herding, which is 
affected by distribution characteristics of data. As LSV measure relies on the proportion of market 
participants buying or selling within a given period, the complexity of trading motives of various 
participants dilutes its content of herding intensity. To the extent that measuring herding makes 
more sense in a short period as pointed out by Christoffersen and Tang (2009) and the fact that LSV 
does not capture dynamic order flows, it would be less ideal in the analysis of data with higher 
frequencies. Hence, in recent years various measures have been proposed with a view to 
overcoming the limitations of past research. Radalj and McAleer (1993) note that the main reason 
for the lack of empirical evidence of herding may lie in the choice of data frequency, in the sense 
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that too infrequent data sampling would lead to intra-interval herding being missed (at monthly, 
weekly, daily or even intra-daily intervals). For the purposes of our investigation we used the PS 
(2006) measure, which we consider the most suitable, since it overcomes this problem of intraday 
data. PS (2006) has a major advantage over others in that it is constructed from intraday data, that is, 
a daily indicator is obtained but from intraday data, since we consider this to be the ideal frequency 
of data to test for the presence of investor herding behavior. It does not assume herding to vary with 
extreme market conditions, and considers the market as a whole rather than a few institutional 
investors.  
PS (2006) propose a statistic that measures herding intensity in terms of the number of runs. 
The bootstrapped runs test of PS (2006) uses run numbers of buy and sells orders according to 
Mood (1940) with nontrading adjustments. We utilize this method because our data set contains 
identification of buy or sell orders, so we would not need Lee and Ready (1991) and Finucane 
(2002) to determine directions of investors’ trading directions. If traders engage in systematic 
herding, the statistic should take significantly negative values, since the actual number of runs will 
be lower than expected. 
2,1
)1()21(),,( 　　　 =
−−+
= i
n
pnpr
tjix iii   (3) 
Where ir  is the actual number of type i runs (up runs, down runs or zero runs), n is the total number of 
trades executed on asset j on day t, ½ is a discontinuity adjustment parameter and ip  is the 
probability of finding a type of run i. Under asymptotic conditions, the statistic ),,( tjix  has a 
normal distribution with zero mean and variance 
222 )1(3)1(),,( iiii pppptji −−−=σ   (4) 
So the herding intensity statistic is expressed as 
),,(
),,(),,(
2 tji
tjix
tjiH
σ
=   (5) 
which has an asymptotic distribution of N(0,1). Mood (1940) requires state variables to be 
independent and i.i.d. as well as continuously distributed. As realized transaction price of stock is 
discrete, ),,( tjiH  would have a non-normal distribution and critical values for testing the 
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existence of herding would have to be constructed through bootstrapping the sample. 
 
III. Data and empirical results 
This study employs intra-day order book data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange starting from 
January 1st, 2005 to December 31st, 2006, covering stocks of 525 firms over a period of 495 trading 
days. Excluded from the complete pool of stocks listed on the exchange are those with irregularities 
and unusual exchange sanctions. As the Taiwan Stock Exchange would only release limit book data 
two years later, the two years are the latest we could obtain so far. The data include date, exact time 
in hours, minutes and seconds, stock code, price and volume traded in number of titles of all trades 
executed during the above-mentioned period. Individual stock returns, market capitalizations, daily 
turnover and price-book ratios are obtained from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. 
We divided each daily session between 9:00 AM and 1:30 PM into 9 intervals with 30 minutes 
in each interval. As our data contains flags identifying the type of investors as proprietary dealers, 
investment trust, QFII and individuals, we proceed with analysis for each type of investors. 
Percentages of trading volume in the stock market accounted for by them over the last ten years in 
Table I. QFII’s percentages have apparently grown much faster than the other two types. As a matter 
of fact, QFII owns one third of the total market capitalization as of end of 2008, which produces the 
one quarter of daily volume as shown in Table I. Table II reports orders submitted by four types of 
investors for stocks of 525 firms over the entire data period of 495 days. As the number of 
individuals is overwhelming, their orders are almost 10 times those of QFII. On average, more than 
20% of the individual and proprietary orders are submitted during the first half hour of a regular 
four and half hour trading session, while only around 15% of orders from the other two types are 
placed in this period. In the last half hour period, the percentages range between 9% and 19%. 
Trading in other periods is usually slower than open and close. 
To construct the herding intensity measures required for our study, we begin by sorting the 
trades for each day (having excluded all those executed outside normal trading hours) by stock code 
and measuring the number of up or down zero runs that took place during the day, as well as within 
each of the nine 30-minute intervals. We then compute herding statistic in the respective periods 
according to PS (2006). A summary of the computed herding measures at any given day are 
reported in Table III. In computing PS herding measures, only the orders actually filled are included 
in the computation to avoid reporting unrealistic herding phenomenon. As herding measures are 
computed separately for each type of investor, they are not comparable across investor type. Similar 
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situation applies to Table IV where herding measures of any given 30-minute interval are given. The 
computed daily herding measures in Table III are larger in magnitudes than those intra-day ones in 
Table IV, a pattern consistent with Dorn, et at. (2008), which argued that herding measures rise with 
length of period. We have also reported in Table V breaks down Table IV by 30-minute intervals. 
The distribution of medians is similar to that across time intervals as in Table II, and across different 
types of investors as in Table IV. For all and each type of investors, we bootstrapped their 1%, 5% 
and 10% critical values. Table VI gives the critical values for all stocks as well as for stocks in top 
and bottom return deciles. The bootstrapped 30-minute intra-day critical values and percentages of 
significance for the PS herding measures computed in Table V are given in Table VII. The 
distribution across time and investor is similar to that in Table V. Across all investors at 1% 
significance level, the opening interval is the one with the highest percentage, about 70% higher 
than the bootstrapped percentage. The closing interval has the lowest significance percentage, about 
28% below. Among all types of investors, QFII’s exhibit the strongest herding behavior in the 
opening interval, followed by individuals and investment trusts. Herding of proprietary dealers is 
quite different from the other three types, peaking at mid-day sessions.  
The distribution of significant herding percentage in Table VII suggest that intraday herding 
occurs most likely in the opening interval, which is consistent with predictions of information-based 
hypotheses on herding. However, if we analyze further how buy and sell orders are distributed 
during days when herding is significant, we will observe a different pattern. Table VIII gives the 
sizes of buy and sell orders, in thousand shares, for all days where herding is significant at 1%. The 
ratios of average buy orders to average sell orders, for days when herding is significant at 1%, is 
slightly higher than for the entire period. Among investor types, buy-sell ratios are greater than 1 for 
all institutionals during days of herding, and the ratios for QFII’s and Proprietary Dealers are higher 
than their counterpart in all periods. If we look further into the opening intervals, we find that 
overall buy-sell ratios during herding days are actually lower than the entire period. But for the 
closing interval, not only the ratios are generally higher than those in the opening interval, but those 
in herding days are also higher than in the entire period. This indicates that, on the one hand, buying 
force in the closing interval is stronger than that in the opening interval, which is inconsistent with 
the information cascade hypothesis as closing interval on average is not one with large amount of 
information. On the other hand, the fact that herding intensifies buying over selling in herding days, 
for institutionals in both the opening and the closing intervals, suggest the phenomenon is consistent 
with predictions of the VW hypothesis. There is a higher buyer-seller ratio in herding days, 
especially during the closing intervals within these days. If we look at stocks in the top and bottom 
return deciles, the buy-sell ratios are, as expected, higher in the top return decile. In the bottom 
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return decile, buy-sell ratios are in general lower than 1. But in both the opening and closing 
intervals of herding days for the two return deciles, the ratios are higher than in the entire period. 
Buy-sell ratios in the closing intervals are uniformly higher, around 20%, than in the opening 
intervals. Even for the bottom return decile, there appears to be a stronger, about 24% in magnitude, 
buying force near market close than right after market open. These findings are not consistent with 
the information cascade hypothesis but supportive of the search cost model of herding. Although 
percentages of significant herding statistics in the closing interval are the lowest among all intervals 
as shown in Tabel VII, the trading concentration from large amount of orders in Table II still exhibit 
high buyer/seller ratio as predicted in a clientele equilibrium of VW.   
We now turn our attention to stock characteristics and their relations to daily and intra-day 
herding by different types of investors. Table IX contains percentages of significant herding values, 
for quantiles of market capitalization, turnover and P/B ratio, in the entire period as well as for 
periods of bull and bear market. Percentages of herding values beyond critical values under each 
significance level provide us with the relative strength of herding behavior. The bull market is 
defined as when short term moving averages of market index went above long term moving 
averages, a bull market is defined vice versa. The table shows that, for the entire data period, there 
are strong patterns for herding to concentrate in large cap and low P/B ratio stocks. This pattern gets 
stronger in periods of bull market, where herding also increases with turnover. The results in Table 
IX clearly questions information cascade as a valid explanation on intraday herding. Stronger 
evidence of this patter in periods of bull market supports predictions from a search model of stock 
trading in the sense of VW, where there are more buyers than sellers, stock prices are relatively 
higher, and trading volume is also higher. 
Table X applied two regression models to examine the information cascade effects t proxied by 
market capitalization, turnover and price-book ratio. We performed a panel regression, adjusted for 
autocorrelation, with generalized least squares random effect based on  
tkkk
i
itkikt PBTOMCHH εγγγβα +++++= ∑
=
− 321
2
1
,
  (6) 
where t=1,…,495 and k=1,…,525. The information cascade effect is proxied by MCk, TOk and PBk , 
denoting quantile values of market capitalization, turnover and price-book ratios respectively for a 
given stock k over the data period. So the smaller the magnitudes of γ’s are, the stronger the 
information cascade effect the result implies. As PBk is correlated with MCk and TOk, to obtain 
sensible estimates for PBk we have also conducted a two stage least square estimation with PBk 
instrumented by MCk and TOk, in the first stage. So γ1 and γ2 are estimated according the panel 
  15
model above, while γ3 is obtained in the second stage of the panel two stage least square model. The 
results are against the information cascade hypothesis as in Table IX, and more pronounced in 
stocks with the highest returns. Across intraday intervals, orders in the opening interval exhibit 
patterns most against the information cascade hypothesis, with the strongest γ’s among all intervals. 
The implication seems to suggest that the information cascade effect, if any, should be stronger at 
market close. These evidences are consistent with BCW as information about firms with good 
information quality is more likely to be correlated among informed traders’ possession. At market 
open, stronger herding is related to competition among informed traders due to these signals, while 
less competition near market close yields weaker ties between information quality and herding. 
Table XI reports results from a model designed to analyze the first type of search cost effect. 
Herding values are regressed, adjusted for autocorrelation, on the average price difference of buy 
and sell orders in the following model, 
tkt
i
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  (7) 
Where BSD stands for the price difference between sell and the buy orders associated with all the 
transaction prices averaged over a given day. Positive values of the coefficient estimates suggest 
lower price spreads accompanied herding. This effect is the stongest for QFII’s and individuals, and 
decreases from open to close. These findings are consistent with the distribution of buy and sell 
orders reported in Table VIII. Again, the market depth brought by information competition in BCW 
is consistent with the observed stronger effect of spread on herding at market open, as well as its 
U-shaped distribution over the day. We have also examined specifically two subcategories where 
MCk=1, TOk =1, PBk =5 (stocks with the poorest information quality) and MCk=5, TOk =5, PBk =1 
(stocks with the best information quality) to determine how search cost effect behave there. Results 
show that herding is not so much related to search cost in stocks with the greatest information 
quality as it is to those with the poorest information quality.  
Table XII reports results for the second type of search cost effect. Herding values are regressed, 
adjusted for autocorrelation, on the average price difference of buy and sell orders in the following 
model, 
tktkt
i
itkikt SFTBFTHH εγγβα ++++= ∑
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2
1
,
  (8) 
Where BFT and SFT are average times to fill a buy or a sell order over a given day. Positive and 
greater values of the coefficient estimates suggest shorter time to fill induces stronger herding, or a 
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stronger horizon effect. As in Table XII, this effect is the strongest for QFII’s and individuals, and 
also decreases from open to close, consistent again with Table VIII as well as Hu (2006). It is worth 
noting that the buy-side search horizon effects are almost uniformly greater than the sell-side ones, 
consistern with property (c) of VW model laid out in page 7.  Moreover, the search horizon 
effect not only disappears near market close, a minor reverse buy search horizon effect arises at 
market close. This is supportive of a possible information cascade effect where longer time to fill 
induces herding while giving up information. 
In order to identity how herding pattern varies among investor types, we report in Table XIII 
As we see from the results above, herding of investors in the very short run are related to one 
another to some extent. So we apply a Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) model to explore if there is 
any leader-follower relation in the herding behavior of various types of investors.  
tit
i
iit
i
iit
i
iit
i
it THTHTHTHY εθλγβα +++++= −
=
−
=
−
=
−
=
∑∑∑∑
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
, i=1,…,4  (9) 
where ),,,( ttttt IHFHMHTHY = with THt denoting, in any given day t, herding measure of 
proprietary dealers, MHt that of investment trust, FHt that of QFII and IHt as herding measure of 
individuals. Results of the VAR model suggests that herding within each investor type is, as 
expected, highly positively autocorrelated. Herding measures of QFII’s and individuals affect 
each other positively. There is no other relationship found among the four types of investors. The 
fact that herding of QFII’s also follows that of the individual investors indicates that information 
cascade cannot characterize trading interactions between the two groups. 
 
IV. Discussion on the cause of herding 
 
The preliminary results of our analysis indicate that, according the method of PS (2006), 
herding behavior is not consistent with the information cascade hypothesis. First of all, individuals 
and QFII are the two investor types with the stronger herding behavior. They are supposed to be the 
most and the least informationally informed in the stock market. This evidence is inconsistent with 
the cascading order of information among investors according the BWH. Our results also indicate 
that herding is stronger in stocks with the highest returns during the data period. Herding is also 
more prominent in days of bull market than in bear market. Although opening intraday interval is 
most likely trigger information related market moves and contains higher percentage of significant 
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herding days, the buy-sell ratios are uniformly higher in the closing interval, even for stocks with 
the lowest returns in the data period. 
Categorizing stocks according to certain characteristics leads us to further conclusion that 
herding is not consistent with information-based hypotheses. The majority of the trading volume 
tends to herd on stocks with the highest market capitalizations, which are supposed to be of the best 
information quality according to AZ, BHW and Sias (2004). The prediction of these literatures is 
that herding should be less likely to appear there. The herding of QFII is consistent with Kang and 
Stulz (1997), which argued that home bias is a factor, but as results in this study are obtained in a 
different context we would need other models to support them. Similar argument applies to the 
analysis of herding by stock turnovers. As a dynamic indicator, daily turnover also reflects 
information quality in the sense of AZ and BHW. Our finding is opposite to their predictions, 
suggesting furthermore that behavior in this market does not support the information cascade theory. 
The analysis with respect to price-book ratio is also inconsistent with information theory. Majority 
of investors herd on trading stocks with low price-book ratio suggest their focus is on stocks likely 
to be under-valued by market. As the ratio is well known and does not change rapidly in a short 
period, it is difficult to conceive lots of orders submitted to capture information on something stable. 
Proprietary dealers and investment trust tend to herd on medium or high a P/B ratio stock, 
suggesting their behavior might be related to factors other than information. 
The search model of VW is based on search cost of various types of investors in the market. 
Investors with higher search cost, or shorter search horizon, should value liquidity more than others. 
According to VW, insurance companies have long horizon than the hedge funds. Similarly, we 
could consider in the Taiwan market individuals and QFII as having lower search horizons than the 
other two types of institutional investors. In a clientele equilibrium, investors with high shorter 
horizons generate more trading, and this reduces search times and trading costs. They have a 
stronger preference for short search times, preferring trading in the respective ‘sub-market’ despite 
the higher prices. Since there are more sellers in the sub-market with shorter search time, buyers’  
search times are shorter. Therefore, holding all else constant, buyers and sellers follow one another 
entering into market. According to buy-sell ratios reported in Table VIII, the relative buying 
strength of QFII’s in closing intervals of herding days is 3.4 times that in the opening interval. For 
individuals the relative strength is only 1.1, and around 0.3 for Proprietary Dealers and Investment 
trusts. So there could exist certain information-induced herding in the opening interval, but 
whenever herding takes place, buying is always stronger than selling across the market especially 
right before market closes. VW search model is an more ideal model than information cascade to 
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explain this phenomenon. 
The search model for trading concentration by VW is capable of explaining the main results in 
this study. Herding occurs in rising stocks within a bull market and there tend to be more buyers 
than sellers. Sellers would then follow buyers due to lower search or trading costs involved. The 
concentration of order flows following one another reflects dynamic optimization of search for best 
asset allocation by each investor. Therefore at market open when the information cascade is the 
weakest, as shown in Table X, the search cost effect happens to be the strongest, as found in Table 
XI. QFII’s and Individuals, who exhibit the search cost effect on herding, affect each other 
significantly dynamically. This implication leads us to question strongly again the validity of the 
information cascade hypothesis. 
Findings on herding related to stock characteristics can also be explained properly the search 
model. Stocks with higher market caps and turnovers are the ones easiest to sell in a very short 
period of time. Sellers with liquidity constraint would naturally flock to markets for these stocks, 
and that attracts short-horizon investors, such as individuals and QFII, to come in and buy. Stocks 
with low price-book ratios are themselves subjects implying low search costs, therefore 
short-horizon buyers would also follow one another in trading them. The focus of attention here is 
not just the allocation of trading volume across intra-day intervals. Our adoption of the PS 
bootstrapped runs test assures that herding is series of order flows or transaction prices that show 
intensive patterns of buyers and sellers following one another. So the argument that our results are 
consistent with the search model for trading concentration is actually beyond the context of static 
allocation of asset holdings. As a result, we observe ‘habitat’ type of herding phenomena which are 
not compatible with panic-driven behavior from information cascade. 
The VAR regression result of individuals following QFII’s is also consistent with a context of 
VW search model. Herding of QFII’s creates liquidity first and draws individuals to join the 
respective market for individual stocks, on the other hand individuals help building a clientele 
equilibrium in the sense of VW, inducing more QFII’s to enter. Other institutional investors with 
longer-horizon would not follow as prices in these markets are already high due to concentration. 
Information-based hypotheses are not supported by the examination of market-wide herding 
under up or down market direction. In our analysis, herding only occur in an up market, not in a 
down one. The notion of panic selling in a bearish market is supposed to drive up herding behavior, 
but results in Table VIII give none at all. If we perceive the up market as one with low search time 
then we would observe more substantial herding. The down market with confusing signals about 
individual stocks is not ideal for the short-horizon majority of market and hence we do not see 
significant herding results. 
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V. Conclusion 
This study presents a set of intra-day order book data to study cause of herding behavior in the 
securities market. We adopted a herding measure that is specifically ideal for high frequency data. 
Herding measures are not only on a daily level, but also within intra-day time intervals. Although 
the analysis is the study is still preliminary, we have found strong evidences against the popular 
information cascade hypothesis for herding. Specifically, we found that herding on an intraday level 
occurs in stocks with the highest returns and more prominent in days of bull market. Market as a 
whole and individuals in particular, is found to herd on stocks with high market capitalization, high 
turnover and low price-book ratio, patterns incompatible with information-induced herding. A 
simple regression yields results where QFII and individuals exhibited herding on stocks with falling 
prices, and a VAR regression produces a significant support for individuals to follow QFII in 
herding. These evidences do not support the hypothesis of information cascade for herding. 
We propose in this study an alternative hypothesis in addition to information cascade to 
explain the herding phenomena we find. Search cost effect is stronger at market open, while 
information cascade effect is stronger at market close. The search model for trading concentration 
by VW fits in well with our analysis. QFII and individual investors, facing more uncertainty 
inherent in individual stocks, have shorter search horizon and higher search costs in trading 
individual stocks. Their herding hence responds more prominent to search time. As short-horizon 
investors tend to follow others in making buying and selling decisions, the observed herding 
behavior near market close can be justified accordingly. High market cap and turnover, and low 
price-book ratio are also characteristics of a market that is ideal for individual and QFII investors to 
rush in to trade when they observe trading concentration emerges. The spirit of VW model is also 
consistent with the information competition model of BCW and Hu (2006) in explaining intraday 
trading patterns. Therefore we argue that VW model should be considered along with the 
information cascade theory of AZ and BHW in explaining intra-day and daily herding of various 
types of investors. 
Although we have presented valid arguments regarding the central issue of this study, there are 
areas we do have to work on to enrich our study with. We have yet to investigate further stocks with 
statistically significant herding phenomenon for more evidence supporting the search cost model. 
Other analysis, such as trading motives of investors, evidence on sequence or development of 
trading concentration and the dynamics of search equilibrium need to be added to the current model 
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as well.  
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Table I  Institutional Trading Volume as Percentages of the Taiwan Stock Market 
 
Proprietary dealers Investment Trust QFII
1998 1.6 2.6 2.0
1999 1.9 3.4 3.0
2000 1.9 3.8 4.5
2001 1.7 4.1 7.1
2002 1.9 4.1 7.7
2003 2.7 4.1 10.7
2004 3.4 3.1 12.5
2005 4.1 3.4 17.9
2006 3.4 2.7 18.4
2007 2.9 2.7 19.6
2008 3.1 3.4 24.3
%
Volume Percentages (%)年

Source：Financial Supervisory Commission
 
 
 
 
Table II Orders by type of investors and time of day 
Averaged over 495 trading days 
Investor Type All Day 9:00~
9:30
9:30~
10:00
10:00~
10:30
10:30~
11:00
11:00~
11:30
11:30~
12:00
12:00~
12:30
12:30~
13:00
13:00~
13:30
Proprietary Dealer 8558 1755 1064 834 716 673 651 594 705 1566
Investment Trust 6817 997 838 732 700 706 706 731 744 663
QFII 84086 11273 8883 8174 8166 8146 8455 8876 10201 11912
Individuals 790275 176874 111960 83988 70032 61049 56174 54046 64065 112088
Time of Day
 
 
 
Table III  Summary Statistics of Daily Herding Measures by Investor Type 
Across 525 firms over 495 trading days 
Investor Type No. of  Obs. MaximumMinimum Mean Median Q1 Q3 S.D.
All Investors 252666 8.222 -143.164 -4.330 -3.113 -5.953 -1.173 5.102
Proprietary Dealers 43356 4.737 -29.643 -3.562 -3.307 -4.636 -2.101 2.321
Investment Trust 32434 4.066 -31.882 -4.656 -4.226 -5.980 -3.130 2.871
QFII 88594 15.215 -59.017 -7.898 -6.429 -10.278 -4.041 5.825
Individuals 251700 7.467 -155.487 -4.508 -3.213 -6.127 -1.234 5.463  
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Table IV  Summary Statistics of 30-minute Interval Herding Measures by Investor Type 
Across 525 firms over 495 trading days 
Investor Type No. of  Obs.MaximumMinimum Mean Median Q1 Q3 S.D.
All Investors 2044779 6.021 -90.339 -0.895 -0.536 -1.837 0.492 2.272
Proprietary Dealers 189248 4.849 -19.877 -0.464 -0.302 -1.265 0.447 1.466
Investment Trust 149267 5.000 -15.334 -0.652 -0.378 -1.500 0.447 1.526
QFII 600558 8.300 -34.128 -2.075 -1.508 -3.411 -0.192 2.677
Individuals 2016662 6.223 -90.305 -0.938 -0.544 -1.866 0.480 2.403
 
 
Table V Summary Statistics of Intra-day Herding Measures by Investor Type and 
Time of Day 
Across 525 firms over 495 trading days 
 
 
Time  No of  Obs Maximum Minimum Average Median Q1 Q3 S.D. 
Panel A: All Traders 
9:00~9:30 239099 4.7374  -90.3387 -1.3031  -0.8528  -2.2948  0.3015  2.6476  
9:30~10:00 233386 5.8000  -67.5619 -1.1487  -0.7423  -2.1429  0.3536  2.4109  
10:00~10:30 228812 5.2669  -48.6301 -0.9743  -0.6124  -1.9415  0.4472  2.2851  
10:30~11:00 224697 5.4222  -48.2734 -0.8952  -0.5517  -1.8594  0.4575  2.2290  
11:00~11:30 220989 4.7958  -45.6915 -0.7983  -0.4472  -1.7321  0.5477  2.1743  
11:30~12:00 217516 5.4813  -33.1995 -0.7552  -0.4082  -1.6977  0.5774  2.1649  
12:00~12:30 217314 6.0212  -36.4468 -0.6857  -0.3780  -1.5757  0.6255  2.1357  
12:30~13:00 223027 5.5156  -46.9705 -0.7474  -0.3974  -1.6503  0.5774  2.1600  
13:00~13:30 239939 5.8977  -38.1938 -0.7064  -0.4082  -1.5900  0.5774  2.0739  
Panel B: Proprietary Dealers 
9:00~9:30 40373 4.1576  -14.7580 -0.6088  -0.3780  -1.5000  0.4472  1.4571  
9:30~10:00 25941 4.1576  -12.3377 -0.4171  0.0000  -1.0690  0.4472  1.4507  
10:00~10:30 19765 4.8493  -12.9306 -0.4378  0.0000  -1.2247  0.4472  1.4878  
10:30~11:00 16707 4.3333  -11.4785 -0.4321  0.0000  -1.0690  0.4472  1.4696  
11:00~11:30 15941 4.1576  -11.1921 -0.4383  0.0000  -1.0690  0.4472  1.4587  
11:30~12:00 15434 4.2000  -11.6723 -0.4854  0.0000  -1.2649  0.4472  1.4809  
12:00~12:30 14208 4.5000  -14.0418 -0.4911  -0.3015  -1.1471  0.4472  1.4363  
12:30~13:00 16628 4.1576  -14.3585 -0.5032  -0.3780  -1.2649  0.4472  1.4634  
13:00~13:30 24251 4.7374  -19.8768 -0.2743  0.0000  -1.0000  0.4472  1.4618  
Panel C: Investment Trust 
9:00~9:30 21817 4.1576  -13.5346 -0.8690  -0.5774  -1.7321  0.3333  1.6165  
9:30~10:00 19821 4.1576  -15.2236 -0.6598  -0.3780  -1.5076  0.4472  1.5128  
10:00~10:30 17224 4.3333  -12.4586 -0.5977  -0.3780  -1.2649  0.4472  1.4851  
10:30~11:00 16290 4.1576  -11.2366 -0.5820  -0.3780  -1.2649  0.4472  1.4929  
11:00~11:30 16051 4.1576  -15.3345 -0.6220  -0.3780  -1.2910  0.4472  1.5258  
11:30~12:00 15799 4.3818  -12.4586 -0.6349  -0.3780  -1.2993  0.4472  1.5301  
12:00~12:30 15543 4.1576  -13.4350 -0.6955  -0.3780  -1.5076  0.4472  1.5635  
12:30~13:00 15136 4.7676  -13.0842 -0.6605  -0.3780  -1.5000  0.4472  1.5467  
13:00~13:30 11586 5.0000  -11.7576 -0.4002  0.0000  -1.0000  0.4472  1.3324  
Panel D: QFII 
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9:00~9:30 71705 6.1279  -34.1282 -2.4953  -1.8856  -3.9104  -0.3780  2.9513  
9:30~10:00 67790 7.0491  -28.6726 -2.0979  -1.5076  -3.4112  -0.2582  2.6792  
10:00~10:30 65308 7.2449  -27.0949 -1.9835  -1.5076  -3.2733  0.0000  2.5996  
10:30~11:00 65246 7.7200  -24.7292 -1.9824  -1.5076  -3.2733  0.0000  2.6021  
11:00~11:30 63991 8.3002  -22.9442 -1.9790  -1.5076  -3.2733  0.0000  2.6195  
11:30~12:00 64623 7.4136  -23.9833 -1.9917  -1.5076  -3.2857  0.0000  2.6093  
12:00~12:30 64794 8.0539  -24.6123 -1.9915  -1.5076  -3.3204  0.0000  2.6571  
12:30~13:00 67522 7.5718  -27.1340 -2.1299  -1.5811  -3.5386  -0.2294  2.7134  
13:00~13:30 69579 6.2450  -26.3037 -1.9865  -1.5076  -3.2733  -0.1525  2.5745  
Panel E: Individuals 
9:00~9:30 236766 4.7374  -90.3053 -1.3650  -0.8950  -2.3534  0.2774  2.7855  
9:30~10:00 231031 5.8000  -71.3469 -1.1886  -0.7569  -2.1676  0.3536  2.5343  
10:00~10:30 226047 5.1149  -53.1249 -1.0096  -0.6124  -1.9467  0.4472  2.4122  
10:30~11:00 221422 6.1470  -56.7684 -0.9251  -0.5252  -1.8600  0.4650  2.3568  
11:00~11:30 217153 4.7958  -46.0360 -0.8298  -0.4472  -1.7321  0.5443  2.3024  
11:30~12:00 213380 5.0000  -36.8290 -0.7809  -0.3780  -1.6971  0.5774  2.2950  
12:00~12:30 213322 6.2225  -39.6919 -0.7274  -0.3780  -1.5811  0.6202  2.2792  
12:30~13:00 219795 5.5678  -51.1702 -0.8015  -0.4045  -1.6886  0.5774  2.3143  
13:00~13:30 237746 5.8977  -43.4025 -0.7712  -0.4472  -1.6503  0.5392  2.1836  
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Table VI  Bootstrapped Daily Critical Values for Herding Measures 
 
by Return Declile and Investor Type 
 
 
Significant 
level 
Critical Value 
All investors Proprietary Dealers  
Investment 
Trust QFII Individuals 
All stocks 
1% -23.3085  -10.8860  -13.8468  -28.3998  -24.9934  
5% -13.5336  -7.5256  -9.9422  -19.3977  -13.9099  
10% -10.0530  -6.2869  -8.2915  -15.4251  -10.2904  
Top 
deciles  
1% -19.8238  -11.6374  -13.3006  -24.5394  -20.9225  
5% -13.6048  -7.3188  -9.4821  -17.7015  -13.8582  
10% -10.9445  -5.9008  -7.9628  -14.1015  -11.1581  
Bottom 
deciles 
1% -21.3848  -10.6404  -16.5587  -27.8832  -22.6346  
5% -12.6709  -7.2365  -10.7262  -18.0436  -12.9979  
10% -9.3482  -6.0722  -8.7508  -14.2123  -9.5883  
 
 
Table VII  Bootstrapped Intra-day Critical Values and Herding Significance Percentages 
 by Intraday Intervals and Investor Type 
 
Critical Values 9:00~    9:30 
9:30~  
10:00 
10:00~ 
10:30 
10:30~ 
11:00 
11:00~ 
11:30 
11:30~ 
12:00 
12:00~ 
12:30 
12:30~ 
13:00 
13:00~ 
13:30 
All Investors 
1% -9.182  1.70% 1.29% 1.01% 0.94% 0.82% 0.82% 0.79% 0.85% 0.72% 
5% -5.080 7.35% 6.28% 5.26% 4.93% 4.50% 4.37% 4.09% 4.31% 3.74% 
10% -3.676 13.90% 12.38% 10.75% 10.00% 9.21% 8.89% 8.18% 8.66% 7.76% 
Proprietary Dealers 
1% -5.528 0.81% 1.03% 1.15% 1.17% 1.13% 1.13% 1.08% 1.05% 0.81% 
5% -3.497 5.72% 4.63% 5.11% 4.95% 4.55% 5.61% 4.89% 5.04% 3.98% 
10% -3.676 11.80% 9.44% 10.09% 9.27% 9.69% 10.88% 9.87% 10.16% 7.93% 
Investment Trusts 
1% -6.084 1.42% 0.90% 0.77% 0.82% 0.98% 0.99% 1.07% 1.16% 0.49% 
5% -4.264 6.88% 4.75% 4.34% 4.56% 4.82% 4.94% 5.51% 5.17% 3.00% 
10% -3.463 13.31% 10.01% 9.12% 9.23% 9.82% 10.05% 10.95% 10.45% 6.28% 
QFII’s 
1% -12.073 1.85% 1.02% 0.83% 0.81% 0.81% 0.80% 0.90% 1.05% 0.84% 
5% -8.068 7.06% 5.10% 4.43% 4.50% 4.63% 4.48% 4.84% 5.27% 4.36% 
10% -6.347 13.23% 10.11% 9.18% 9.18% 9.40% 9.35% 9.65% 10.40% 8.92% 
Individuals 
1% -9.627 1.55% 1.22% 1.01% 0.97% 0.87% 0.86% 0.83% 0.92% 0.73% 
5% -5.093 7.17% 6.10% 5.23% 4.90% 4.50% 4.43% 4.22% 4.48% 3.82% 
10% -3.645 13.93% 12.17% 10.52% 9.84% 9.11% 8.80% 8.31% 8.85% 7.97% 
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Table VIII  Daily and Intra-day Buy and Sell Orders, All Days and When Herding Is Significant at 1% 
By Investor Type 
Investor Type 
9:00~9:30 13:00~13:30 All Day 
All days Days when herding 
is significant at 1% 
All days Days when herding 
is significant at 1% 
All days Days when herding 
is significant at 1% 
 Average 
buy orders 
per lot 
Average 
sell orders 
per lot 
Average 
buy orders 
per lot 
Average 
sell orders 
per lot 
Average 
buy orders 
per lot 
Average 
sell orders 
per lot 
Average 
buy orders 
per lot 
Average 
sell orders 
per lot 
Average 
buy orders 
per lot 
Average 
sell orders 
per lot 
Average 
buy orders 
per lot 
Average 
sell orders 
per lot 
All Stocks 
All 14.19  14.24  15.09  18.33  19.92  18.07  22.82  18.53  8.50  8.45  9.64  9.56  
Proprietary Dealers 29.77  24.81  68.96  15.11  23.37  25.39  26.57  19.69  21.66  22.17  26.22  8.61  
Investment Trusts 41.53  31.41  56.62  29.49  31.58  27.62  66.09  53.32  28.68  25.34  13.77  12.88  
QFII’s 27.12  26.18  43.95  25.22  69.19  59.72  130.17 26.60 17.10  17.34  14.05  12.39  
Individual 10.54  11.12  10.05  22.82  9.76  10.18  9.66  17.31  7.29  7.36  7.02  7.67  
 Top Stock Return Decile 
All 5.43  5.24  6.46  5.87  5.67  5.29  7.15  5.65  5.44  5.28  5.99  5.96  
Proprietary Dealers 17.95  15.20  6.36  12.28  11.91  12.60  9.25  12.80  14.96  14.39  6.49  5.33  
Investment Trusts 25.99  17.91  25.48  18.95  22.56  17.95  14.28  5.22  19.33  16.13  11.66  11.08  
QFII’s 7.93  6.76  4.73  3.95  13.30  12.61  5.88  4.24  7.52  7.06  4.28  3.90  
Individual 5.02  4.95  5.47  5.32  5.00  4.83  3.00  3.07  5.02  4.94  5.18  5.33  
 Bottom Stock Return Decile 
All 10.81  10.64  15.53  13.06  12.39  12.39  18.76  12.67  10.53  10.85  10.17  12.83  
Proprietary Dealers 32.68  31.13  34.55  20.14  26.12  29.81  56.59  37.77  25.82  28.30  31.04  12.15  
Investment Trusts 58.67  46.06  180.25  24.81  41.04  31.32  45.81  56.36  39.80  34.26  14.58  13.49  
QFII’s 18.88  18.87  19.95  6.95  45.79  46.07  39.87  42.69  20.61  20.84  18.02  10.53  
Individual 10.22  9.98  12.58  12.53  9.92  10.18  9.35  10.77  9.64  9.91  8.64  10.71  
 
In thousand shares 
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Table IX  Daily Herding Significance Percentages by Market Caps, Turnovers and P/B Ratios 
By Market Type 
 All Periods Bull Market Bear Market 
Size Quantiles 
Median 
Herding 
Values 
% of Herding Values Lower 
than Critical Values 
Median 
Herding 
Values 
% of Herding Values Lower than 
Critical Values 
Median 
Herding 
Values 
% of Herding Values Lower than 
Critical Values 
1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
S1 (Lowest) -0.80812 0.01% 0.10% 0.38% -1.375  0.05% 0.17% 0.51% -.0.762  0.00% 0.03% 0.11% 
S2 -1.86253 0.01% 0.29% 1.09% -2.333  0.09% 0.34% 1.26% -1.612  0.01% 0.22% 0.79% 
S3 -3.08607 0.04% 1.10% 3.54% -3.378  0.13% 1.49% 4.17% -2.805 0.01% 0.50% 2.85% 
S4 -4.24691 0.23% 2.73% 8.14% -4.595  0.16% 2.96% 9.07% -3.956  0.06% 2.02% 7.54% 
S5 (Highest) -7.81885 4.54% 20.19% 35.68% -8.136  5.05% 23.01% 39.25% -7.402  4.22% 17.85% 32.75% 
Turnover 
Quantiles 
Median 
Herding 
Values 
% of Herding Values Lower 
than Critical Values 
Median 
Herding 
Values 
% of Herding Values Lower than 
Critical Values 
Median 
Herding 
Values 
% of Herding Values Lower than 
Critical Values 
1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
T1 (Lowest) -1.82259 1.38% 5.66% 9.73% -2.054  1.61% 7.81% 10.36% -1.674  1.26% 4.70% 9.15% 
T2 -2.46654 1.45% 5.47% 9.73% -2.791  1.68% 7.16% 10.63% --2.255 1.18% 4.39% 9.14% 
T3 -2.67146 0.75% 3.94% 7.83% -2.979  1.86% 5.28% 9.82% -2.338  0.83% 2.57% 6.94% 
T4 -3.09628 0.69% 3.57% 7.17% -3.394  2.11% 5.04% 9.31% -2.741  0.90% 2.01% 6.59% 
T5 (Highest) -5.24758 0.72% 6.37% 15.40% -5.652  2.56% 8.77% 17.97% -4.684  0.39% 4.93% 12.97% 
P/B Ratio 
Quantiles 
Median 
Herding 
Values 
% of Herding Values Lower 
than Critical Values 
Median 
Herding 
Values 
% of Herding Values Lower than 
Critical Values 
Median 
Herding 
Values 
% of Herding Values Lower than 
Critical Values 
1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
P1 (Lowest) -4.61069 1.62% 8.54% 16.98% -4.850  2.33% 10.62% 18.68% -4.409  1.29% 6.75% 13.89% 
P2 -4.3726 1.89% 8.60% 16.12% -4.502  2.88% 10.71% 18.13% -4.018 1.35% 7.09% 13.54% 
P3 -3.02499 1.03% 4.60% 9.14% -3.181  1.94% 6.89% 11.96% -2.820  0.62% 3.76% 7.43% 
P4 -2.71063 0.29% 2.18% 5.19% -2.901  0.46% 3.15% 7.40% -2.376  0.16% 1.67% 5.51% 
P5 (Highest) -1.42887 0.08% 0.81% 2.06% -1.886  0.19% 1.46% 3.42% -1.207  0.02% 0.41% 1.4% 
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Table X Information Cascade Effects, Intraday and Intraday Intervals 
The information cascade effect is proxied by three variables, MCk, TOk and PBk , denoting quantile values of 
market capitalization, turnover and price-book ratios respectively for a given stock k over the data period. We 
performed a panel regression with generalized least squares random effect based on  
tkkk
i
itkikt PBTOMCHH εγγγβα +++++= ∑
=
− 321
2
1
,
 
where t=1,…,495 and k=1,…,525. The smaller the magnitudes of γ’s are, the stronger the information cascade 
effect is. As PBk is correlated with MCk and TOk, to obtain sensible estimates for PBk we have also conducted a two 
stage least square estimation with PBk instrumented by MCk and TOk, in the first stage. So γ1 and γ2 are estimated 
according the panel model above, while γ3 is obtained in the second stage of the panel two stage least square model. 
 
Time No of obs. γ1 γ2 γ3 
     
Intraday     
 All stocks  246,444 -0.6841 (0.0069)** -0.2004 (0.0054)** 1.1535 (0.0118)** 
 Top Return Decile  25,284 -0.8358 (0.0205)** -0.3543 (0.0185)** 2.1752 (0.0665)** 
 Bottom Return Decile  27,584 -0.6741 (0.0193)** -0.5597 (0.0201)** 1.4546 (0.0362)** 
     
Intraday intervals     
 9:00-9:30 223,518 -0.4177 (0.0043)** -0.1720 (0.0036)** 0.7787 (0.0079)** 
 9:30-10:00 215,344 -0.4206 (0.0042)** -0.1592 (0.0035)** 0.7525 (0.0076)** 
 10:00-10:30 208,294 -0.4207 (0.0041)** -0.1446 (0.0034)** 0.7423 (0.0076)** 
 10:30-11:00 202,241 -0.4137 (0.0042)** -0.1262 (0.0034)** 0.7165 (0.0076)** 
 11:00-11:30 196,426 -0.4072 (0.0042)** -0.1102 (0.0034)** 0.6935 (0.0077)** 
 11:30-12:00 201,367 -0.4987 (0.0040)** -0.1284 (0.0034)** 0.6855 (0.0078)** 
 12:00-12:30 191,570 -0.3922 (0.0042)** -0.0880 (0.0034)** 0.6538 (0.0077)** 
 12:30-13:00 199,926 -0.4008 (0.0041)** -0.0919 (0.0033)** 0.6679 (0.0075)** 
 13:00-13:30 224,232 -0.3875 (0.0036)** -0.0846 (0.0029)** 0.6107 (0.0061)** 
Estimates of β’s for autocorrelation terms are all extremely significant and are not reported. Standard deviations 
are in the parentheses and ** denotes significant a t 1%. 
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Table XI  Spread Effect of Search Cost on Herding, 
 Intraday and Intraday Intervals 
The spread effect of search cost is proxied by, BSDkt , the average difference, within the period 
of interest, of buy and sell orders associated with transaction prices on a given stock. We 
performed a panel regression with generalized least squares random effect based on  
tkt
i
itkikt BSDHH εδβα +++= ∑
=
−
2
1
,
 
where t=1,…,495 and k=1,…,525. A greater δ implies stronger herding is accompanied by lower 
order price spreads, suggesting a stronger the search cost effect in a clientele equilibrium. 
Regressions are also conducted for given stock characteristic categories. The category of 
{MCk=1, TOk =1, PBk =5} is selected as the intersection of stocks are expected to have the 
poorest information quality for trading and strong herding should not have been driven by a 
strong search cost effect if information cascade effect does affect herding. The category of 
{MCk=5, TOk =5, PBk =1} is supposed to have the best information quality and is analyzed as a 
contrast. 
 
Time No of obs. δ R-squared 
    
Intraday    
 All investors  245,462 0.6139 (0.0093)** 0.5273 
 Proprietary Dealers  23,388 0.1104 (0.0347)** 0.1205 
 Investment Trusts  11,649 0.2430 (0.0554)** 0.0381 
 QFII’s  62,439 0.7271 (0.0385)** 0.2503 
 Individuals  244,005 0.7254 (0.0107)** 0.4732 
    
Intraday intervals    
 9:00-9:30 222,640 0.4561 (0.0056)** 0.3360 
 9:30-10:00 214,523 0.4321 (0.0062)** 0.2837 
 10:00-10:30 207,330 0.4094 (0.0065)** 0.2589 
 10:30-11:00 201,505 0.3724 (0.0067)** 0.2303 
 11:00-11:30 195,722 0.3529 (0.0068)** 0.2179 
 11:30-12:00 190,921 0.3402 (0.0069)** 0.2141 
 12:00-12:30 190,895 0.3517 (0.0068)** 0.2205 
 12:30-13:00 199,202 0.3679 (0.0066)** 0.2322 
 13:00-13:30 223,350 0.3900 (0.0053)** 0.2613 
    
For Given Stock Characteristic Categories   
 MCk=1, TOk =1, PBk =5 6,644 0.1531 (0.0155)** 0.1686 
 MCk=5, TOk =5, PBk =1 5,892 -0.0357 (0.0829) 0.2032 
    
Estimates of β’s for autocorrelation terms are all extremely significant and are not reported. 
Standard deviations are in the parentheses and ** denotes significant a t 1%. 
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Table XII  Search Time Effect on Herding, 
 Intraday and Intraday Intervals 
The search times of buy and sell orders are proxied by, BFTkt and SFTkt respectively. The former 
is the average time to fill a buy order within the period of interest, while the latter is that to fill a 
sell order. A particular transaction price could correspond to more than one orders placed at 
different times. We performed a panel regression with generalized least squares assuming 
heterscedastic but uncorrelated across panels based on the following equation, 
tktkt
i
itkikt SFTBFTHH εγγβα ++++= ∑
=
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2
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,
 
where t=1,…,495 and k=1,…,525. Greater γ’s imply a stronger herding is induced by a longer 
search time for an equilibrium price, suggesting a stronger the search cost effect in a clientele 
equilibrium. Regressions are also conducted for given stock characteristic categories.  
 
Time No of obs.    γ1x1,000  γ2 x1,000 
    
Intraday    
 All investors  245,088 0.3992 (0.0058)** 0.3200 (0.0058)** 
 Proprietary Dealers  23,366 0.1506 (0.0347)** 0.0061 (0.0244) 
 Investment Trusts  11,609 0.2705 (0.0033)** 0.4157 (0.0669)** 
 QFII’s  62,405 1.2981 (0.0351)** 0.5167 (0.0414)** 
 Individuals  243,631 0.4622 (0.0063)** 0.3705 (0.0089)** 
    
Intraday intervals    
 9:00-9:30 222,222 1.1291 (0.0288)** 0.6161 (0.0356)** 
 9:30-10:00 213,757 0.4305 (0.0144)** 0.2856 (0.0152)** 
 10:00-10:30 207,059 0.1947 (0.0068)** 0.0974 (0.0094)** 
 10:30-11:00 201,156 0.1004 (0.0048)** 0.0272 (0.0066)** 
 11:00-11:30 195,443 0.0668 (0.0038)** -0.0125 (0.0055)** 
 11:30-12:00 190,714 0.0532 (0.0032)** -0.0198 (0.0046)** 
 12:00-12:30 190,719 0.0151 (0.0026)** -0.0079 (0.0040)* 
 12:30-13:00 199,072 -0.0034 (0.0022) -0.0095 (0.0036)** 
 13:00-13:30 222,792 -0.0170 (0.0017)** 0.0060 (0.0028)* 
Estimates of β’s for autocorrelation terms are all extremely significant and are not reported. 
Standard deviations are in the parentheses, and ** and*denotes significant a t 1% and 5% 
respectively. 
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Table XIII  VAR Analysis of Intra-day Herding Measures among 
Investors 
The VAR regression is based on the following models, 
t
i
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i
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where t is the day index and ),,,( ttttt IHFHMHTHY = with THt denoting herding measure of 
proprietary dealers, MHt that of investment trust, FHt that of QFII and IHt as herding measure 
of individuals. 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
tTH  tMH  tFH  tIH  
1β  2β  1γ  2γ  1λ  2λ  1θ  2θ  
tTH  
0.1822** 
(0.0134) 
0.1626** 
(0.0134) 
-0.0071 
(0.0089) 
0.0103 
(0.0090) 
0.0012 
(0.0043) 
-.0008 
(0.0043) 
0.0035 
(0.0032) 
-0.0103** 
(0.0032) 
tMH  
0.0219 
( 0.0196) 
0.0307 
(0.0196) 
0.1517** 
(0.0132) 
0.0452** 
(0.0133) 
-0.0010 
(0.0063) 
0.0073 
( 0.0063) 
0.0321 
(0.0045) 
-0.0108** 
( 0.0046) 
tFH  
0.0384 
(0.0412) 
0.0413 
(0.0418) 
-0.0079 
(0.0281) 
0.0049 
(0.0282) 
0.3402** 
(0.0134) 
0.1137** 
(0.1341) 
0.0892** 
(0.0096) 
0.0299** 
( 0.0097) 
tIH  
-0.0344 
(0.0572) 
0.1247 
( 0.0572) 
-0.0660 
(0.0385) 
-0.0754 
(0.0387) 
0.0648** 
(0.0184) 
0.2930** 
(0.0184) 
0.3221** 
(0.0131) 
0.1342** 
(0.0133) 
Standard deviations are in the parentheses and ** denotes significant at 1%. 
 
